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A BALANCING ACT: FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS AND THE REASONABLE 
SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORY 
ACCESS TO E-MAIL ACCOUNTS 
JOSEPH P. GRYZLO† 
Applying 18th Century notions about searches and seizures to 
modern technology, however, is easier said than done, as we are 
asked to measure Government actions taken in the “computer 
age” against Fourth Amendment frameworks crafted long before 
this technology existed.  As we do so, we must keep in mind that 
“the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an individual—let’s call him Steven—owned and 
operated a business.2  Steven was convicted on counts stemming 
from the business conducting a scheme to defraud its customers 
through false advertising, as well as fabricated customer 
satisfaction and product effectiveness statistics.3  He received a 
twenty-five-year sentence for his conduct, had to pay a fine of 
about $100,000, and was forced to surrender hundreds of millions 
of dollars.4 
Part of the government’s evidence against Steven came from 
information derived from thousands of e-mails he had sent and 
received involving one particular e-mail account he had with an 
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).5  Early on in the investigation, 
 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2016, St. John’s University School of 
Law. 
1 United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2014) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1569 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
2 The following facts come from United States. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th 
Cir. 2010). 
3 Id. at 277, 281. 
4 Id. at 281–82. 
5 Id. at 282–83. The ISP provided and hosted the e-mail account involved in this 
case. Id. 
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the government had requested the ISP save copies of all future e-
mails involving Steven’s account, which the ISP did.6  Later in 
the investigation, the government required the ISP to provide the 
preserved e-mails, once by subpoena and once by an ex parte 
court order.7  At no time did the government obtain, nor even 
apply for, a warrant to search Steven’s e-mails.8  Before trial, 
Steven moved to exclude the e-mails, alleging a Fourth 
Amendment violation; however, this motion was denied.9  The 
foregoing facts come from an actual case, United States v. 
Warshak, which was ultimately appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.10 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the government had 
violated Steven’s Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining access 
to his e-mails through the ISP without a warrant.11  In its 
analysis, the court concluded that Steven’s subjective expectation 
of privacy in the content of his e-mails stored, sent, and received 
through the ISP was objectively reasonable.12  This is important 
because if an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is 
unreasonable, Fourth Amendment protections do not apply.13  As 
 
6 Id. at 283. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 274. 
9 Id. at 281. 
10 Id. at 266. 
11 Id. at 288. However, the court ultimately upheld the government’s use of 
information stemming from this e-mail account because the government had relied 
in good faith on provisions of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”). Id. at 292. 
The SCA authorized the steps the government took in preserving and directing 
disclosure of the copies of Steven’s e-mail account, and the government had used the 
SCA in good faith as a guide, as the SCA had yet to be declared unconstitutional to 
the extent it permitted warrantless seizure of e-mails. Id. at 289. As a result, the 
information the government obtained from the account could be used as evidence, 
and Steven did not get the benefit of the holding. Id. at 289–90. But, because the 
court found that the government’s conduct was a violation of Fourth Amendment 
protections, the court further held the SCA unconstitutional in this context. Id. at 
288. Therefore, good faith reliance on the SCA going forward will not exist, and such 
conduct in the future will result in the exclusion of such evidence. Id. 
12 Id. at 286. The Warshak court pointed out that neither the ability of a third 
party to access the contents of communication, nor the right of access to the 
communication of the company providing the service necessarily defeats the 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 286–87. 
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The 
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
determined by a two-part test: (1) the individual must exhibit an actual expectation 
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a result, the court concluded that Fourth Amendment protections 
apply to the contents of e-mail accounts stored with third parties, 
such as ISPs.14  Thus, a warrant based on probable cause is 
needed for the government to constitutionally compel an ISP or 
other e-mail service provider to provide the contents of an e-mail 
account.15 
However, the determination in Warshak that a warrant 
based on probable cause is needed for the government to obtain 
access to an e-mail account from an e-mail service provider raises 
another question.  If the government does have probable cause, it 
will most likely have probable cause to justify a warrant for some 
portion of an e-mail account, but will not have reason to believe 
that the entire account consists solely of e-mails relating to the 
investigation.16  If the government applies for a warrant 
requesting access to an entire e-mail account from an e-mail 
service provider, will a showing of probable cause for some of the 
account enable the government to have a warrant application 
granted for the entire account?  In such cases, there are potential 
complications regarding the particularity of such warrants and 
the reasonableness of the breadth of the warrants.17 
On one side, since there is probable cause for a portion of the 
account, the warrant request should be granted so that the 
government can have access to the information for which it does 
have probable cause.18  On the other side, since the government 
does not have probable cause to believe the entire account 
 
of privacy, and (2) the expectation must be objectively reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
14 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
15 Id. Courts in other circuits have cited Warshak with approval. E.g., In re 
Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email 
Accounts/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-
DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 4647554, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 
27, 2013) [hereinafter In re Target Email/Skype Accounts]; United States v. Bode, 
No. ELH-12-158, 2013 WL 4501303, at *15 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2013); United States v. 
Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012). The United States Supreme Court 
has yet to address the issue. 
16 See United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that 
“few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked ‘drug 
records’ ”). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
18 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 349, 354 (1974) (noting that “restrictions upon means of law enforcement 
handicap society’s capacity to deal with two of its most deeply disturbing problems: 
the fact and the fear of crime”). 
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consists solely of evidence of criminal activity germane to the 
investigation, there are Fourth Amendment privacy 
complications regarding any e-mails not satisfying the probable 
cause showing.19 
The problem lies in the unknown location of the relevant 
information; the location of e-mails that are relevant to an 
investigation is not known prior to someone examining the 
account and parsing responsive from unresponsive material.20  As 
a result, the government will make a warrant application for the 
entire account.  A court faced with such an application has two 
general choices: (1) deny the warrant application for the entire 
account, or (2) grant the warrant application for the entire 
account.  Although this issue has yet to surface in the circuit 
courts, a number of district courts have recently been confronted 
with this problem and have been divided in their rulings.21 
The two general approaches taken by the district courts 
recognize competing interests.  Denial of such warrant 
applications recognizes the individual’s Fourth Amendment right 
to privacy,22 while granting such warrant applications recognizes 
the government’s investigatory ability interest and the desire for 
safety and security.23  With these competing interests in mind, 
this Note argues that, in such situations, a warrant application 
providing the government access to an entire e-mail account 
should be granted.  Not granting the warrant and some of the 
alternatives that have been suggested in light of this position do 
not adequately respect the government’s legitimate investigatory 
interest.  Coupled with certain limitations and ex ante 
 
19 See id. (recognizing that liberty erodes when safeguards to liberty are relaxed 
“[i]n the face of plausible-sounding governmental claims of a need to deal with 
widely frightening and emotion-freighted threats to the good order of society”). 
20 See Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 140–41 (2011) (comparing a search for responsive 
electronic evidence to searching for needles in a haystack and pointing out that, to 
find the needles, it is necessary to look through a lot of hay). 
21 Compare In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-
8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 
4647554, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (declining to grant a warrant giving the 
government access to an entire e-mail account when only partial probable cause 
existed), with In re A Warrant for All Content and Other Information Associated with 
the Email Account xxxxxxx@Gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by 
Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter In re Gmail 
Account] (granting such a warrant). 
22 See Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 354. 
23 Id. 
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minimization procedures, a modified pro-access approach 
effectively strikes a balance between the competing investigatory 
and privacy interests. 
Part I of this Note examines the Fourth Amendment 
particularity requirement, explains how it relates to the breadth 
of probable cause, and surveys how these concepts have been 
applied in the electronic context.  Part II assesses the issue of the 
breadth of probable cause regarding e-mail accounts in particular 
and reviews the different approaches the district courts have 
taken in addressing this issue, as well as other proposed 
solutions that may be implemented in accordance with these 
approaches.  Lastly, Part III proposes a resolution to the 
controversy, balancing the competing interests of privacy and the 
government’s investigatory needs, and argues for a tempered 
version of permitting the government access to an entire e-mail 
account when probable cause only exists for a portion of the 
account. 
I. OVERVIEW: FOURTH AMENDMENT PARTICULARITY AND 
BREADTH OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. Framing the Issue 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.24 
In Warshak, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit determined that the search and seizure of e-mail content, 
received from an ISP without a warrant is unreasonable.25  As a 
result, the warrant requirements stated in the Fourth 
Amendment apply in this context.  These requirements are: 
(1) probable cause; (2) support of the probable cause by some 
form of affirmation; and (3) particularity in the description of 
what is to be searched and seized.26  In addition, there must also 
 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
25 See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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be probable cause to support the breadth of what is being 
sought.27  As this Note assumes probable cause exists for some 
part of an e-mail account, the discussion will focus on the 
particularity requirement, its meaning, and how it relates to the 
breadth of probable cause. 
B. Reasons for the Particularity Requirement 
The particularity requirement is recognized to have been 
included in the Fourth Amendment largely as a result of the 
Framers’ distaste for British Writs of Assistance and, more 
expansively, general warrants.28  During colonial times, the 
British government would issue Writs of Assistance, which 
essentially amounted to broad, general search warrants.29  The 
goal of these warrants was to give the British government power 
to enforce trade and navigation laws in the Colonies by allowing 
officers broad permission to search for smuggled goods.30  Neither 
the house to be searched, nor the type of goods to be searched for, 
would be specified and full discretion over the search was given 
to the officers conducting the search.31 
The Fourth Amendment protects against such general 
warrants and general searches by requiring particularity in a 
warrant’s description.32  With this requirement, the officials 
executing the warrant are limited as to what they can search and 
seize and do not have unfettered discretion.33  This recognizes the 
 
27 See infra note 53; see also In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-
8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-
DJW, 2013 WL 4647554, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (listing the requirements of a 
search warrant: “it must be based on probable cause, meet particularity 
requirements, be reasonable in nature of breadth, and be supported by affidavit”). 
28 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981). For a twentieth-century 
example of a “general warrant,” see Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965) 
(characterizing a warrant that authorized any “books, records, pamphlets, cards, 
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments 
concerning the Communist Party of Texas, and the operations of the Communist 
Party in Texas” as “constitutionally intolerable”). 
29 THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 18 
(2010). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 18–19. 
32 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
33 Id. (“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to 
be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of 
one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is 
left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”). This statement has been 
interpreted to mean that the executing officer does not have discretion as a matter of 
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individual’s interest in privacy and freedom from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion by restricting the scope of the 
government’s investigation to that for which the government has 
probable cause.34 
Other reasons for the particularity requirement have been 
noted.  These reasons are closely related to the overall desire to 
avoid general warrants and the goal of protecting an individual’s 
privacy as much as possible.  For example, since warrant 
applications are granted by a magistrate—a neutral third party 
that operates outside the government’s investigation35—the 
particularity requirement provides independent judgment on, 
and clarification regarding, what may be constitutionally 
searched and seized.36  Particularity in a warrant’s description 
thus gives clarity as to the warrant’s scope, due to the limited 
authorization granted by the magistrate.37  This helps protect an 
individual’s interest in privacy by giving the government clear 
direction and authorization as to what is to be searched for and 
what is to be seized.38 
Another reason given for the existence of a particularity 
requirement is that it helps give sharper teeth to the 
requirement of probable cause, not requiring it in a vague sense, 
but instead for a particular place and for particular things.39  As 
with clarification,40 specificity regarding probable cause helps 
protect an individual’s privacy by limiting the scope of the 
government’s search to that which may be reasonably expected to 
 
opinion to determine whether a particular thing is covered within the parameters of 
the warrant, but does have discretion in determining whether a thing is covered as a 
matter of fact. See Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 165 S.E.2d 302, 307 (Ga. 1968). This 
interpretation implicitly recognizes that the review of some things not described 
under the warrant is permissible. Id. 
34 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1967). For an explanation of 
probable cause, see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) 
(“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [the 
officers’] . . . knowledge . . . [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution [to believe that] an offense has been or is being committed.” 
(internal quotation mark omitted) (citation omitted)). 
35 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 4.6(a) (5th ed. 2014). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
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produce evidence related to the investigation.41  As a result, the 
particularity requirement safeguards property of an individual 
by limiting the government to investigating only what may 
reasonably produce evidence of a crime. 
C. The Meaning of Particularity 
Particularity limits what places are to be searched and what 
objects are to be seized.42  This requirement, along with the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, restricts a search to the area necessary to find the 
evidence for which the government has probable cause.43  Thus, if 
a warrant fails to appropriately define the scope of a search, or 
the resulting search extends beyond what is necessary to find 
what is reasonably sought, there is a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.44 
Whether a warrant’s description satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement is determined based on 
the language of the warrant and the facts and circumstances of 
the case.45  At its core, the Fourth Amendment revolves around 
reasonableness.46  To determine whether a warrant fails the 
particularity requirement, the focus must be on “whether there 
exists probable cause to support the breadth of the search that 
was authorized.”47  In the context of searches, a warrant is 
sufficiently particular if the executing officer can identify the 
 
41 See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (explaining that one function of 
the particularity requirement is to assure individuals that warrants are executed 
under lawful authority and are appropriately limited to searching for what is 
needed). 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
43 See LAFAVE, supra note 36 (“Knowledge that some objects connected with 
criminal activity are to be found on certain premises is no basis for permitting an 
unrestricted search of those premises . . . the described premises may only be 
searched as long and as intensely as is reasonable to find the things described in the 
warrant.”). 
44 Id. 
45 See Martha Applebaum, Note, “Wrong But Reasonable”: The Fourth 
Amendment Particularity Requirement After United States v. Leon, 16 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 577, 580–81 (1987); see also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 
U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (“There is no formula for the determination of 
reasonableness.”). 
46 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
47 United States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting United States v. Hernandez, No. 09 CR 625(HB), 2010 WL 26544, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010)). 
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place the warrant directs the officer to search with reasonable 
certainty.48  Regarding seizures, the determination is ultimately 
based on what discretion is given to the officer executing the 
warrant.49  The officer must be able to determine whether a 
particular thing is covered under the warrant, not as a matter of 
opinion, but as a matter of fact.50  If the officer can determine 
whether a particular thing is covered under the warrant as a 
matter of fact with reasonable certainty, the warrant is 
sufficiently particular.51  The underlying rationale is that the 
warrant, and not the executing officer, dictates where to search, 
what to search for, and what to seize. 
1. Particularity and the Breadth of Probable Cause 
A concept closely tied to the particularity requirement in the 
language of a warrant is the breadth of probable cause.52  The 
standard for sufficient probable cause is, given the situation set 
forth in the affidavit, whether there is a “fair probability” that 
evidence of criminality relating to the investigation will be found 
in the particular place specified in the affidavit.53  As the 
issuance of a warrant is contingent upon a probable cause 
showing, the government must have probable cause to search for 
and seize the items described in the warrant and must have  
 
 
 
48 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). 
49 See Applebaum, supra note 45, at 580; see also supra note 33 and 
accompanying text. 
50 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
51 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
52 The Fourth Amendment requires “probable cause . . . particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV. Therefore, for a warrant to be issued, the government must have probable cause 
for the particular description contained in the warrant. Id. 
53 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983); see United States v. Hernandez, 
No. 09 CR 625(HB), 2010 WL 26544, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010) (explaining that 
one particularity-related inquiry is “whether the items listed as ‘to be seized’ in the 
warrant were overbroad because they lacked probable cause”). In Hernandez, the 
court pointed out that particularity in the language of the warrant is a closely 
related, but distinct, legal issue from the breadth of probable cause. Id. In the latter 
instance, the court referred to the analysis as one into the breadth of the warrant, 
whereas in the former instance, the inquiry is into the particularity of the language 
of the warrant. Id. 
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probable cause to justify the breadth of the search.54  Whether 
the breadth of the search is justified is based on the specific 
circumstances of a case.55 
This concept is best illustrated by example.56  Imagine the 
police observe an individual leaving an apartment, one that was 
known by the police to contain marijuana.  The police observe the 
individual holding a large brown paper bag the size of marijuana 
packages that the police had seen earlier.  They watch as the 
individual walks from the apartment to his car, places the bag in 
his car, and drives away.  As the individual drives off, the police 
pull him over.  They search both the bag the individual was 
observed carrying from the apartment to his car and the rest of 
his car, as well.57 
Under the facts of this example, the police had probable 
cause to search the bag; their prior knowledge regarding the 
apartment the individual was seen leaving, as well as their 
observance of the size of the bag and how it was similar in size to 
previously seen marijuana packages, gave the police probable 
cause to believe the bag contained evidence.58  However, the 
police did not have probable cause to search the rest of the car.59  
No evidence existed for the government to believe the rest of the 
car contained any evidence, and, as a result, the police searching 
 
54 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has recognized that this 
requirement is not absolute: “In searches for papers, it is certain that some 
innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine 
whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.” Andresen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). In particular, this requirement is relaxed 
when the location of the relevant information is not known with exactness: 
Where proof of wrongdoing depends upon documents . . . whose precise 
nature cannot be known in advance, law enforcement officers must be 
afforded the leeway to wade through a potential morass of information in 
the target location to find the particular evidence which is properly 
specified in the warrant. 
In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2014) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578 (D.N.J. 2001)). 
55 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39. 
56 The facts of this example are based on California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 
(1991). 
57 In Acevedo, the officers did not need a warrant because the “automobile 
exception” to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied. Id. at 566, 573. 
However, as the court recognized, even if a warrant is not necessary due to an 
exception, the government must still have probable cause to justify the breadth of a 
search. Id. at 579–80. 
58 Id. at 566–67, 572–73. 
59 Id. at 579–80. 
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the rest of the individual’s car amounted to an overbroad search 
outside of the scope of their probable cause.60  Under the Fourth 
Amendment, the search of the car is impermissible.61 
2. The Plain View Exception 
Although the Fourth Amendment requires particularity in 
the language of the warrant and the scope of probable cause, 
courts have recognized instances where items that are not 
described in the warrant can be seized.  One exception involves 
items not specified in a warrant, but in “plain view” of officers 
executing a valid warrant.62  Under this exception, for example, if 
officials have a warrant to search for certain evidence in a 
particular area and come across other evidence reflecting 
criminality not within the parameters of the warrant but in 
“plain view,” this evidence may be seized by the officials.63  
Importantly, the officers who seize the items in plain view must 
have a legal right—a warrant, for example—to be in the area in 
which the items in plain view were found.64  Absent some legal 
justification to be in the particular place, even if an item clearly 
reflects criminality, the officers cannot invoke the plain view 
exception and seize the item.65  In addition, it must be 
immediately apparent to the officials that the item in plain view 
constitutes evidence of a crime.66  Despite these limitations, the 
particularity required of the language of a warrant and the 
corresponding particularity required regarding the scope of 
probable cause are circumvented by this exception. 
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). The plain view 
exception also applies in instances in which officials are lawfully in a particular 
area, even absent a warrant. 68 GEORGE L. BLUM ET AL., AM. JUR. 2D Searches and 
Seizures § 241 (2014). 
63 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465; see also, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
142 (1990) (determining that a police officer who had a warrant authorizing the 
search of an individual’s home for stolen property could seize weapons observed in 
plain view, even though the weapons were not included in the warrant). 
64 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.; see also Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 (noting that an officer must also lawfully 
be able to access the object intended to be seized under the plain view exception). 
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D. The Fourth Amendment in the Electronic Context 
1. Early Developments 
A starting point in consideration of the Fourth Amendment 
in the electronic context is that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”67  This means that the Fourth Amendment 
may apply not only to searches and seizures in a tangible sense, 
but also to searches and seizures in the electronic world of 
information in which persons may reasonably have an 
expectation of privacy.68 
For example, in Katz v. United States, the government 
conducted an investigation of an individual suspected of passing 
bets across state lines, a violation of a federal statute.69  As part 
of its investigation, the government placed a listening and 
recording device on the side of a public telephone booth where the 
individual made his phone calls.70  During trial, the government 
used these conversations as evidence.71  The defendant argued 
that the government’s listening to and recording of his phone 
calls were a violation of the Fourth Amendment.72  Both the 
defendant and the government focused their arguments on 
whether the telephone booth was a “constitutionally protected 
area” and whether physical invasion of such an area was 
required for a Fourth Amendment violation.73 
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the defendant 
in finding a Fourth Amendment violation in the government’s 
surveillance, but explained that the parties’ arguments were 
misplaced.74  Instead of focusing on the location of the defendant, 
the appropriate consideration involves the person—whether the 
government violated an expectation of privacy upon which an 
individual justifiably relied.75  And, the Court held, since the  
 
 
67 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
68 Id. at 351–52; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (holding a 
New York statute, which authorized eavesdropping through warrants requiring less 
than the Fourth Amendment, unconstitutional). 
69 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 348–49. 
73 Id. at 349–52. 
74 Id. at 351–52, 358. 
75 Id. at 351, 353; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
FINAL_GRYZLO 10/25/2016  9:01 AM 
2016] GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORY ACCESS 507 
defendant justifiably relied on the privacy of his conversations 
within the phone booth, Fourth Amendment protections applied 
to the defendant’s telephone conversations therein.76 
In a similar vein, Berger v. New York77 recognized that 
conversations can be “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.78  Berger involved the examination of a New York 
state statute authorizing electronic eavesdropping and whether 
its requirements were in accordance with the Fourth 
Amendment.79  The Court ultimately found that the statute ran 
afoul of Fourth Amendment protections by authorizing searches 
and seizures that fell short of the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements, thereby characterizing the New York statute as 
plainly overbroad.80  Implicit in this conclusion is that Fourth 
Amendment protection can apply to conversations in which 
persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy, including 
electronically transmitted conversation.81 
2. Recent Developments in the Electronic Context 
Katz and Berger establish that Fourth Amendment 
protections can apply to nontangible electronic things, such as 
phone conversation.  Later cases have also affirmed this idea,82 
including in the context of e-mail accounts.83  Yet, these cases do 
not confront the Fourth Amendment requirements of 
particularity and limited breadth in seeking access to electronic 
information.  More recent developments provide some guidance 
on these issues.84 
 
76 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
77 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
78 Id. at 59. 
79 Id. at 43–44. 
80 Id. at 62–64. 
81 See supra Introduction (explaining that, in United States v. Warshak, 631 
F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), Fourth Amendment protections were extended to e-mail 
accounts). 
82 E.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that, under the 
Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required to search the contents of a cell phone). 
83 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
84 Language from the recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., presents the issue well: 
This pressing need of law enforcement for broad authorization to examine 
electronic records . . . creates a serious risk that every warrant for 
electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering 
the Fourth Amendment irrelevant. The problem can be stated very simply: 
There is no way to be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without 
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For example, in the context of computer hard drive searches, 
courts will often permit off-site review.85  This involves the 
creation of a mirror-image copy of the hard drive, which impacts 
the target’s use of his computer as little as possible, and in return 
provides a more convenient means for the government to search 
the target’s information.86  This procedure allows the government 
to obtain the data on the hard drive for which it has probable 
cause, but, in so doing, it also provides the government access to 
data on the hard drive for which it does not have probable cause.  
However, after obtaining the hard drive, the subsequent search 
of the hard drive must still be conducted in accordance with the 
Fourth Amendment’s rule of reasonableness.87  Reasonableness is 
considered on a case-by-case basis.88 
The parameters of reasonableness have been shaped in 
recent years regarding warrants for electronic information.  
Search warrants authorizing the wholesale search of “computers 
and computer equipment” and “computer records or data” have 
been upheld as reasonable.89  The Tenth Circuit has also noted 
that a search of the contents of a hard drive may extend as far as 
necessary to find the items specified to be seized under the 
warrant.90  In one case, the court upheld a warrant that 
permitted the search of “ ‘any [computer] equipment’ that can 
create or display computer data” and “any and all computer 
software.”91  Because the government agent who conducted the 
 
somehow examining its contents—either by opening it and looking, using 
specialized forensic software, keyword searching or some other such 
technique. . . . By necessity, government efforts to locate particular files 
will require examining a great many other files to exclude the possibility 
that the sought-after data are concealed there. 
621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010). 
85 United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2014). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 136. 
88 Id. 
89 See United States v. Farlow, 681 F.3d 15, 16–19 (1st Cir. 2012); see also 
United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Applying a 
reasonableness analysis on a case-by-case basis, the federal courts have rejected 
most particularity challenges to warrants authorizing the seizure and search of 
entire personal or business computers.”); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 234 
(3d Cir. 2011) (holding seizure of six entire hard drives reasonable). 
90 United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 
United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that, as a 
practical matter, finding relevant information may often involve the government 
looking at many folders and documents contained on a computer hard drive). 
91 Grimmett, 439 F.3d at 1270 (alteration in original). 
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search testified that he limited the search to certain types of files 
likely to reveal the type of information described in the warrant, 
the court upheld the warrant and denied the defendant’s motion 
to suppress.92 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS, PARTICULARITY, AND 
THE BREADTH OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE E-MAIL CONTEXT 
In United States v. Warshak,93 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Fourth 
Amendment protections extend to the content of e-mail accounts 
and that it is constitutionally impermissible for the government 
to obtain access to an individual’s e-mails from a service provider 
without a warrant based upon probable cause.94  As a result, the 
government must obtain a warrant to have access to an 
individual’s e-mails.  Part of the government’s burden in 
obtaining a warrant requires the affidavit in support of the 
warrant to particularly describe what is sought—this applies to 
both the place to be searched and the things to be seized—and 
that the breadth of the warrant’s scope is reasonable.95  Due to 
the nature of e-mail,96 however, the concepts of particularity and 
breadth in this context have proven problematic and there is 
currently a lack of consensus in the district courts as to what 
these requirements entail.97 
The basic approaches fall into two camps, with one side 
denying warrant applications for an individual’s entire e-mail 
account, and the other granting such warrants.98  Both courts 
and commentators have offered suggestions and adjustments 
regarding these approaches.99  The following sections explain the 
two approaches, their rationales, and the suggestions that have 
been proposed in accordance with these approaches, which aim to 
balance the competing interests of the government and the 
individual. 
 
92 Id. 
93 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
94 Id. at 288. 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
96 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra Sections II.A, B. 
98 See infra Sections II.A, B. 
99 See infra Sections II.A, B. 
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A. Approach One: Deny the Warrant Application 
One approach is to deny a warrant application providing the 
government access to an entire e-mail account when probable 
cause has not been established for the entire account.  For 
example, in In re Applications for Search Warrants for 
Information Associated With Target Email Accounts/Skype 
Accounts (“In re Target Email/Skype Accounts”),100 the United 
States District Court for the District of Kansas denied such a 
request.101 
In that case, the targets of the search were alleged to have 
stolen computer equipment and transported it across the 
country.102  The government argued that the targets’ e-mail 
accounts were used to facilitate the criminal activity and sought 
search warrants103 to search for evidence of criminal activity in 
the accounts.104  In denying the search warrant applications, the 
court concluded that the content listed on the applications, if 
handed over, would amount to a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, as the warrants failed to place any restrictions 
whatsoever on which communications and information were to be 
handed over.105  This was problematic in the eyes of the court 
 
100 Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-
JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 4647554 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013). 
101 Id. at *10. The District of Kansas has taken this position in other similar 
cases as well. See, e.g., In re Applications for Search Warrants for Case Nos. 12-MJ-
8119-DJW and Info. Associated with 12-MJ-8191-DJW Target Email Address, Nos. 
12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *11 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 
2012). 
102 2013 WL 4647554, at *1. 
103 The following language is illustrative of the breadth of the warrants: 
[The service provider shall disclose] [t]he contents of all emails, instant 
messages, and chat logs/sessions associated with the account, including 
stored or preserved copies of emails, instant messages, and chat 
logs/sessions sent to and from the account; draft emails; deleted emails, 
instant messages, and chat logs/sessions preserved pursuant to a request 
made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f); the source and destination addresses 
associated with each email, instant message, and chat logs/session, as well 
as the date and time at which each email, instant message, and chat 
logs/session was sent, and the size and length of each email . . . . 
Id. 
104 Id. The procedure of requesting the content and information from the service 
providers was governed by The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. 
Id. at *2. Section 2703 authorizes the government’s ability to request electronically 
stored or held communications, such as e-mail, pursuant to a search warrant under 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. 
105 Id. at *8. “The warrants as currently proposed give the government virtual 
carte blanche to review the content of all electronic communications associated with 
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because the warrants failed to establish probable cause to search 
all of the account information.106  Comparing the government’s 
warrant applications to one requesting that a post office provide 
copies of the contents of all mail to and from a certain address, 
which would not pass constitutional muster, the court concluded 
that the same attempt in the electronic context should likewise 
not be held constitutional.107 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California has taken the same approach when faced with such an 
application.  In the case In re: [REDACTED]@gmail.com,108 the 
court took particular issue with a warrant application’s lack of a 
date range for the desired e-mails, and a lack of language 
indicating that the government would return or destroy 
nonresponsive information.109 
In response to the above concens, some suggestions have 
been made as potential solutions to the problem.  For example, 
although the court in In re Target Email/Skype Accounts did not 
advocate for any particular procedural mechanism that could be 
utilized to avoid overbroad warrant applications while still 
providing the government with access to portions of an e-mail 
account, the court did provide a few suggestions110: (1) asking the 
service provider to limit the amount of content requested by 
restricting the information to e-mails with certain terms, or mail 
only to and from certain recipients; (2) appointing someone to 
hire an independent vendor to use computerized search 
techniques to review the information for relevance; or 
(3) establishing a filter group to review the information for 
relevance.111 
 
the accounts and fail to adequately limit the discretion of the government-authorized 
agents executing the warrants.” Id. at *9. 
106 Id. at *8. 
107 Id. The court noted that while neither the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, nor the Stored Communications Act placed this limitation on the 
government, the Fourth Amendment did. Id. at *9 (“To comport with the Fourth 
Amendment, the warrants must contain sufficient limits or boundaries so that the 
government-authorized agent reviewing the communications can ascertain which 
email communications and information the agent is authorized to review.”). 
108 62 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
109 Id. at 1104 (“This unrestricted right to retain and use every bit [the e-mail 
account] coughs up undermines the entire effort the application otherwise makes to 
limit the obvious impact under the plain view doctrine of providing such unfettered 
government access.”). 
110 In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, 2013 WL 4647554, at *10. 
111 Id. 
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Others have advocated for similar approaches.  For example, 
one scholar suggests that, in the event it is impossible for the 
government to describe which e-mails and other content are 
sought by the government, the appropriate solution would be to 
have the e-mail service provider sift through the content and only 
provide the government with the relevant information.112  In the 
event e-mail service providers resist this burden, she proposes a 
filter-team “consisting of agents or specially-trained computer 
personnel who are not involved in the investigation” do the 
sifting.113  Through this mechanism, it is argued, the Fourth 
Amendment particularity and breadth requirements would be 
satisfied.114 
B. Approach Two: Grant the Warrant Application 
A contrasting approach some courts have taken when faced 
with a warrant application to search an entire e-mail account 
where evidence of a crime is located only in individual messages, 
is to grant the request.  The United States District Courts for the 
District of Maine115 and the District of Nevada116 have granted 
such requests.117  In addition, in In re A Warrant for All Content 
and Other Information Associated with the Email Account  
 
 
 
 
112 Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment 
Particularity and Stored Email Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 1013 (2010). 
113 Id. at 1014–15. 
114 Id. at 1016. 
115 United States v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236–37 (D. Me. 2011). In that 
case, the magistrate judge issued a warrant that permitted the government to 
search all information relating to an e-mail account of the defendants and to seize 
information evidencing the violation of a certain federal statute. Id. at 232. The 
District Court denied the defendant’s later Motion to Suppress: “The Fourth 
Amendment does not require the government to delegate a prescreening function to 
the internet service provider or to ascertain which e-mails are relevant before copies 
are obtained from the internet service provider for subsequent searching.” Id. at 237. 
116 United States v. Bickle, No. 2:10-cr-00565-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL 3798225, at 
*20 (D. Nev. July 21, 2011) (agreeing that a prescreening method is not required to 
separate irrelevant material from relevant material before providing the 
government with access to an e-mail account). 
117 In both Taylor and Bickle, the courts also approved a filter process which 
functioned to filter out privileged material from the e-mail accounts (e.g. information 
between the defendant and his lawyer). However, in neither case was a filter process 
used to filter out irrelevant information. Bickle, 2011 WL 3798225, at *20; Taylor, 
764 F. Supp. 2d at 232–33, 235. 
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xxxxxxx@Gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by 
Google, Inc. (“In re Gmail Account”),118 the Southern District of 
New York also granted such a request.119 
In In re Gmail Account, the government conducted an 
investigation into an individual on the basis of possible unlawful 
money remitting, conspiracy to commit unlawful money 
remitting, and conspiracy to commit money laundering.120  As 
part of its investigation, law enforcement made an application for 
a search warrant to search the contents of, and all information 
associated with, the target’s e-mail account.121  In its application 
for the warrant, the government provided probable cause to 
believe that the e-mail account was being used to conduct 
criminal activity and to believe certain information contained in 
the account would reveal evidence of that criminal activity.122  
The search warrant required the service provider to disclose “ ‘all 
content and other information within the Provider’s possession, 
custody, or control associated with’ the email account, including 
all emails sent, received, or stored in draft form, all address book 
information, and a variety of other information associated with 
the account.”123  The search warrant also directed that law 
enforcement officials were authorized to comb through the 
provided content—that is, the entire account—to locate 
categories of information provided for in the warrant.124 
The court granted the search warrant application, noting 
first that the Fourth Amendment hinges on reasonableness.125  
The court then focused its opinion on the reasonableness of the 
warrant application.126  It stressed the degree of leniency 
regarding which documents could be searched that courts 
generally permit when the government conducts a physical 
search for evidence.127  This allowance is due to law enforcement’s 
need to examine documents in order to perceive their relevance 
to the investigation; it is impossible to know beforehand whether 
 
118 33 F. Supp. 3d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
119 Id. at 388. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 389–90. 
126 See id. at 390–96. 
127 Id. at 391–92. 
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a document is pertinent to the investigation and, as a result, 
sometimes innocuous documents are reviewed.128  Applying this 
concept to the case at hand, the court reasoned that the same 
logic should apply in the electronic context.129  In addition, the 
court disagreed with the option of having the service provider, 
Google, examine the account and send over only relevant 
information, citing Google’s lack of ability to cull responsive 
information, the burden this would place on service providers, 
and the fact service providers consist of private employees who 
have no constitutional responsibilities to the public as significant 
issues that weigh against this option.130 
Another case in which a court granted a warrant application 
in similar circumstances is In re the Search of Information 
Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises 
Controlled by Apple, Inc. (“In re Apple Account”).131  Overturning 
a prior order denying a search warrant request,132 the court held 
that the government’s application complied with the Fourth 
Amendment.133  While echoing the reasoning utilized in In re 
Gmail Account in granting the request, the court did note the 
increased risk of infringements on privacy with the mass of 
information held in undifferentiated electronic format coupled 
with law enforcement’s ability to access such information.134  
However, the court explained that the unique challenges posed 
when searching for responsive electronic data to gather evidence 
requires a practical solution.135  Recognizing the difficulties, if not 
impossibilities, created for law enforcement officials in holding 
otherwise, the court granted the warrant application.136 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 392. 
130 Id. at 394–95. 
131 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014) [hereinafter In re Apple Account]. In this 
case, the government similarly applied for a search warrant to search an e-mail 
account, and provided information to support a finding of probable cause for some of 
the information in the account. Id. at 160. 
132 In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2014). The prior 
order essentially relied on the same reasoning as the court did in In re Target 
Email/Skype Accounts. See supra Section II.A. 
133 In re Apple Account, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 168. 
134 Id. at 163–67. 
135 Id. at 166. 
136 Id. at 166–67. 
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1. Ex Ante Minimization Procedures 
Some courts that have granted warrant applications in the 
electronic context have imposed ex ante limitations regarding the 
handling and retention of the material listed in a warrant.137  For 
example, in a case involving a search warrant for content 
contained on a personal computer, the Supreme Court of 
Vermont upheld an order imposing certain ex ante limitations in 
order to ensure that the Fourth Amendment’s particularity and 
breadth requirements were not violated.138  In that case, the 
court addressed concerns over the constitutional authority of the 
magistrate to impose such restrictions.139  Since the restrictions 
on a warrant become part of the warrant, the government’s 
nonobservance of the restrictions amounts to a constitutional 
violation.140  Noting that disagreement exists as to the 
constitutionality of ex ante limitations,141 the court ultimately 
upheld the limitations.142  The court focused on the fact that the 
Fourth Amendment ultimately is based on reasonableness, 
pointing out that such restrictions provide one way 
reasonableness can be achieved.143  In addition, in the physical, 
nonelectronic realm, certain ex ante limitations144 can be, and 
often are, imposed.145  As a result, although the Fourth 
Amendment does not require ex ante limitations be imposed on a 
warrant, the court held that, in appropriate circumstances, the 
imposition of ex ante limitations is permitted.146 
The use of ex ante minimization procedures has not been 
met with universal approval.  One argument against imposing 
such procedures is that other procedures are available that 
 
137 Examples of such limitations include limiting the permitted search methods, 
directing the destruction or return of nonresponsive information, and requiring the 
government to place a limit on the amount of time they may search and seize. See In 
re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1162–63 (Vt. 2012) 
[hereinafter In re Search Warrant]. 
138 Id. at 1182. 
139 Id. at 1166–70. 
140 Id. at 1164. 
141 See Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2010). 
142 In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1170. 
143 Id. 
144 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
145 In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1170. 
146 Id. 
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provide adequate relief, such as suppression motions.147  This 
renders the imposition of prospective limitations unnecessary.148  
Another argument is that the imposition of prospective 
limitations is impermissible altogether, as magistrates do not 
have the authority to impose such restrictions.149  Under this 
view, such restrictions are unreasonable because they judge the 
reasonableness of a search before the search ever takes place and 
impermissibly control the method by which a search must be 
conducted.150 
2. Elimination of the Plain View Doctrine in the E-mail Context 
Another idea that has been suggested to limit the effects of 
unrestricted government access to an e-mail account is to 
eliminate the plain view doctrine in the electronic context.151  
Doing so would allow the government broad access to content, 
some of which the government likely does not have probable 
cause for, but would prevent the government from using any 
information derived from this content that falls outside the scope 
of the warrant.152  As a result, this suggestion grants the 
government discretion in conducting a search, but preempts use 
of seized information at trial to only what was specified in the 
warrant.153  So, instead of preventing the government from seeing 
information outside the scope of a warrant, this method prevents 
the government from using that information.  However, like the  
 
 
 
 
 
147 See In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
148 Id. 
149 See Kerr, supra note 141, at 1246. 
150 Id. 
151 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
531, 582–84 (2005) [hereinafter Searches and Seizures in a Digital World]. However, 
when the article was written in 2005, Kerr noted that “[i]t is too early for courts or 
Congress to impose such a rule.” Id. at 583. In a recent Washington Post article, 
Kerr suggested that the time may have come, at least for the e-mail context. Orin 
Kerr, A Remarkable New Opinion on Search Warrants for Online Accounts – And 
Why I Think It’s Wrong [hereinafter New Opinion on Search Warrants  
for Online Accounts], WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/27/remarkable-new-opinion-on-online-accounts. 
152 Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 151, at 582–83. 
153 Id. at 583. 
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suggestion of ex ante minimization procedures, the elimination of 
the plain view doctrine in the electronic context has been met 
with some disapproval.154 
III. THE CURRENT APPROACHES’ INADEQUACIES: PROPOSED 
RESOLUTION 
District courts have taken inconsistent approaches when 
faced with a warrant application that would provide the 
government access to an entire e-mail account when probable 
cause does not exist for the entire account.155  As a result, this 
area of the law is muddled with conflicting views and 
incompatible opinions.  This conflict derives from the ambiguity 
of the Fourth Amendment; as courts have repeatedly quoted, “the 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness.’ ”156  While reasonableness has developed some 
definitional contours in the physical realm, it has proven difficult 
to shape in the cybersphere.157 
The cases summarized in Part II of this Note provide some 
guidance as to what courts interpret reasonableness to mean 
regarding particularity in warrant applications for e-mail 
accounts and the appropriate breadth of e-mail account 
disclosure.158  While the two general approaches agree that 
reasonableness involves a balance of the individual’s right to 
privacy and the government’s need to investigate criminal 
activity, the approaches weigh the two factors differently.159  
However, neither approach balances these competing interests 
adequately.  While denying warrants that request full access to 
an individual’s e-mail account or requiring e-mail service 
provider or third-party involvement, both which significantly 
restrict law enforcement,160 granting such warrants outright fails 
to adequately respect the individual’s right to privacy.161  Instead, 
an appropriate solution would be to grant warrant applications 
 
154 See Alison Bonelli, Comment, Computer Searches in Plain View: An Analysis 
of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 759, 780–81 (2011). 
155 See supra Part II. 
156 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
157 See supra Part II. 
158 See supra Part II. 
159 See generally supra Part II. 
160 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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giving the government full access to an e-mail account through 
the e-mail service provider, while imposing ex ante minimization 
procedures on a case-by-case basis and abolishing the plain view 
doctrine in this context.  Through these methods, the 
government’s role in investigating crime and the individual’s 
right to privacy are balanced in a reasonable manner. 
This section elaborates on why the current approaches are 
inadequate and proposes a middle ground approach, which 
incorporates the rationales behind the current approaches to 
achieve a reasonable solution.  In addition, potential criticisms of 
the proposed solution are considered and addressed. 
A. Why the Current Approaches Are Inadequate 
The two current approaches each have troublesome 
implications.  Denial of a warrant application requesting full 
access to an e-mail account in this context hampers the 
government’s ability to investigate crime,162 and therefore fight it 
as effectively as possible.163  This problem is accentuated by the 
prevalence of the e-mail account as a means of communication, 
both for personal and business use.164  Law enforcement efforts 
would also be burdened if, as has been suggested,165 a court were 
to order the e-mail service provider or a third party to cull 
responsive information from an e-mail account.166  Having an e-
mail service provider produce only the responsive information 
would involve a number of issues.  These include the substantial 
burden that would be placed on e-mail service providers,167 e-mail 
 
162 See supra Section II.A. 
163 See In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 395–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 
Amsterdam, supra note 18. 
164 The number of e-mail accounts worldwide was estimated to be 3.9 billion in 
2013 and is expected to increase to over 4.7 billion by 2017. Email Statistics Report, 
2013–2017, THE RADICATI GROUP, INC. (April 2013), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Email-Statistics-Report-2013-2017-Executive-Summary. 
pdf. 
165 See, e.g., In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-
8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 
4647554, at *10 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013); Friess, supra note 112, at 1013–14. 
166 In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 395. 
167 Id. at 394–95; see also Friess, supra note 112, at 1014 (noting the possibility 
that e-mail service providers, such as ISPs, may be unwilling to function in this 
role). The potential for significant burden becomes obvious when one considers the 
number of users some e-mail service providers have. See Sean Ludwig, Gmail 
Finally Blows Past Hotmail to Become the World’s Largest Email Service, 
VENTUREBEAT (June 28, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/06/28/gmail-hotmail-
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service providers’ lack of skill in conducting law enforcement 
investigations,168 and the problem of allowing private companies 
to know the details and scope of law enforcement 
investigations.169  While some of these issues would not be 
present if a court were to instead order a third party, such as a 
filter team “consisting of agents or specially-trained computer 
personnel . . . who are not involved in the investigation” to sift 
through the information,170 this approach is also not free of 
issues171 and is often rejected by courts in other contexts.172 
In addition, in the similar context of computer searches, 
warrants authorizing the wholesale seizure of computer records 
by the government have been found reasonable.173  In so holding, 
courts recognize that, although probable cause does not exist for 
an entire computer, the government may be allowed access to the 
computer in order to search for relevant information.174 
However, granting a warrant application requesting full 
access to an e-mail account, while imposing no subsequent 
restrictions on the government’s ability to search and seize the 
 
yahoo-email-users/ (reporting that, in June 2012, Gmail had 425 million monthly 
active users). 
168 In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 395. Of course, the government could 
provide the e-mail service provider with certain terms for the provider to use to 
search for evidence. However, this procedure oversimplifies the nature of 
investigations. For a simple explanation of why this is, see New Opinion on Search 
Warrants for Online Accounts, supra note 151: 
[T]ake the facts of this case. Maybe the suspects in this case are dumb and 
they wrote things in their e-mail such as, “let’s engage in a conspiracy to 
commit a criminal kickback scheme that is a felony crime!” If so, a keyword 
search for terms like “conspiracy” and “kickback” will retrieve at least some 
of the evidence. But maybe the suspects are more savvy, and they used code 
words that a keyword search won’t easily identify. 
169 In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 395. 
170 See Friess, supra note 112, at 1014 (suggesting this method). 
171 For example, this approach merely transfers the intrusiveness of the search 
from being an act of government to being an act of a third party working at the 
direction of the government. Although the Fourth Amendment is concerned with 
government over-intrusiveness, privacy concerns are not adequately solved by 
having someone else read an individual’s personal information for the government. 
172 See United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he 
Fourth Amendment [does not] require the executing authorities to delegate a pre-
screening function to the internet service provider or to ascertain which e-mails are 
relevant before copies are obtained from the internet service provider for subsequent 
searching.”). 
173 See supra Section I.D.2. 
174 See supra Section I.D.2. 
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information contained within the account,175 is not 
unproblematic.  Due to the widespread use of e-mail for both 
personal and business communication,176 unrestricted wholesale 
authorization would give the government the ability to freely 
examine and use large masses of information, much of which the 
government likely does not have probable cause for.177  
Significantly, this is questionable in light of the Fourth 
Amendment requirement of particularity in a warrant’s 
description and the requisite limited breadth of a subsequent 
search and seizure.178 
B. Proposed Resolution 
As noted above, denying a warrant application that provides 
the government access to an entire e-mail account or having e-
mail service provider or third-party involvement is problematic.  
This points towards using the other approach some courts have 
taken—granting such applications outright.179  However, this 
approach is equally problematic because the government would 
have virtual carte blanche access to, and the unrestricted ability 
to use, all of the information contained in an e-mail account.  
And, as the Fourth Amendment reflects, unrestrained 
government investigatory capabilities are unsettling.  As a 
result, adopting the following two restrictions in this context, 
while still permitting the government full access to an e-mail 
account upon probable cause for some of an account, achieves a 
reasonable balance of the government’s and the individual’s 
interests: (1) on a case-by-case basis, impose certain 
minimization procedures, and (2) eliminate the plain view 
doctrine in this context. 
 
175 See supra Section II.B. 
176 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
177 In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-
DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 4647554, at 
*8 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013). 
178 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Indeed, for example, although in the context of 
computer hard drive searches, courts have found the seizure of entire hard drives 
reasonable, the subsequent search of the hard drives is still subject to a 
reasonableness examination. See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
179 See supra Section II.B. 
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1. Ex Ante Minimization Procedures 
One way in which the government’s and the individual’s 
interests can be balanced is the imposition of certain ex ante 
minimization procedures, if necessary, to limit government 
overintrusiveness when conducting searches of e-mail 
accounts.180  Examples of potentially effective minimization 
procedures include instructions “requiring police to use focused 
search techniques and prohibiting the use of specialized search 
tools without prior court authorization,” as well as instructions 
“pertaining to the copying, destruction and return of data.”181  
The procedures to be imposed, if any, depend upon the nature 
and facts of an investigation; however, it is important that courts 
consider implementing them to limit the potential for 
government overintrusiveness.182 
Against this suggestion, some would argue that ex ante 
restrictions should be proscribed because they determine the 
reasonableness of a search before the search takes place.183  
Another argument against the restrictions is that other 
procedures, such as suppression motions, provide adequate relief 
in themselves.184  However, some courts have recognized the 
utility of such restrictions and that some jurisdictions even 
statutorily require minimization procedures in the context of 
warrants for electronic surveillance.185  While imposing ex ante 
minimization procedures is not a flawless solution, the 
procedures may provide an effective tool in preventing 
government investigatory overreach and should be considered to 
provide balance to the competing interests of the individual and 
the government. 
2. Elimination of the Plain View Doctrine in This Context 
Additionally, to combat the fear of general warrant issuance 
in the e-mail context, the government’s ability to use information 
found in an e-mail account should be limited to the information 
that is specified in the warrant; in other words, the plain view 
 
180 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
181 In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1172 (Vt. 2012). 
182 See supra Section II.B.1. 
183 E.g., Kerr, supra note 141, at 1246. 
184 In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
185 In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1170. 
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doctrine should be eliminated in this context.186  Any information 
that may be potentially incriminating but falls outside of the 
scope of information to be seized should be subject to exclusion at 
trial.  This position recognizes the interests of both the 
government and the individual.  While the government has 
latitude in accessing an individual’s entire e-mail account, its 
ability to use any information uncovered is limited in scope to the 
information sought before the government started looking into 
the account, and to the information for which the government 
already had probable cause to believe was in the account. 
Despite the advantages this approach has in balancing the 
interests of the government and the individual, it comes with the 
significant drawback that it could lead to undesirable results due 
to its broad and inflexible nature.187  As a disturbing illustration: 
[T]he evidence in plain view could be profoundly serious, 
ranging from photographs of a kidnapped child to plans to 
commit acts of terrorism.  The judicial directive to forswear in 
advance the plain view doctrine, placed in a different context, is 
equivalent to demanding that a DEA investigative team 
engaged in the search of a residence for drugs promise to ignore 
screams from a closet or a victim tied to a chair.188 
As a result, it has been argued that abolishing the plain view 
exception is inadvisable because it prevents the government from 
prosecuting individuals who are known to have committed crimes 
outside the scope of the current investigation.189 
 
186 Professor Orin Kerr has advocated for this abolition in the general electronic 
context. See Kerr, supra note 151, at 582–83. This position has also found some 
support in the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“When the government 
wishes to obtain a warrant to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage 
medium to search for certain incriminating files, or when a search for evidence could 
result in the seizure of a computer . . . magistrate judges should insist that the 
government forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine.” (citation omitted)). But see 
id. at 1184 (Callahan, J., concurring) (“The more prudent course would be to allow 
the contours of the plain view doctrine to develop incrementally through the normal 
course of fact-based case adjudication.”). The elimination of the plain view doctrine 
is technically a type of ex ante minimization procedure, as the procedure 
prospectively imposes a restriction on the government’s capabilities. In re Search 
Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1172. 
187 Eric Yeager, Note, Looking for Trouble: An Exploration of How to Regulate 
Digital Searches, 66 VAND. L. REV. 685, 714–15 (2013). 
188 Id. at 714 (quoting United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 
4728690, at *7 n.3. (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009)). 
189 Id. at 715–16. 
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Despite the fact that the abolition of the plain view doctrine 
may sometimes lead to perverse and undesirable results, there 
are a couple of important points to mention in support of 
abolishing the plain view doctrine in the context of e-mail.  For 
example, this approach does not necessarily prevent the 
government from prosecuting individuals for crime X when the 
warrant is directed toward crime Y.  Rather, this abolition only 
prohibits the government from prosecuting those individuals for 
crime X based on information learned from the warrant seeking 
evidence of crime Y.  This means that if the government has 
probable cause at a later point for the same individual relating to 
the crime, which was previously in plain view but not within the 
scope of the warrant, the government may still prosecute that 
individual for that crime.  Additionally, at least in the e-mail 
context, absent granting the government broad access to an e-
mail account, the government would never come across this 
evidence now in “plain view.” 
Lastly, if the plain view exception is not abolished in the e-
mail context, it is possible that the rationale behind the concepts 
of particularity and overbreadth, which are at the core of the 
Fourth Amendment, will be rendered irrelevant.190  E-mails, like 
other forms of electronic storage and communication, can store 
an incredible amount of personal information.  Absent 
eliminating the plain view doctrine, allowing the government 
access to an entire e-mail account, which is preferable compared 
to the alternatives that have been suggested,191 would mean that 
no restrictions would exist as to the information the government 
could use against an individual.192  This result would run counter 
to the Fourth Amendment and could very well have the effect of 
rendering the particularity and breadth requirements 
immaterial.193 
CONCLUSION 
The protections of the Fourth Amendment in the electronic 
context have started to take shape in recent years.194  Specific to 
the context of e-mail accounts, one circuit court has held that 
 
190 Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 151, at 566. 
191 See supra Section III.A. 
192 Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 151, at 566. 
193 Id. 
194 See supra Section I.D and Part II. 
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Fourth Amendment protections apply to e-mail accounts stored 
with e-mail service providers.195  Courts in other circuits have 
cited this opinion with approval.196  However, even if this position 
is universally adopted, it would simply mean that a warrant is 
required for the government to access an e-mail account stored 
with a third party.  It does not answer the more specific question 
of what portion of an account may constitutionally be provided to 
the government under a warrant granting access to the account, 
given that the government will likely not have probable cause for 
the entire account.197  This issue has been faced by several 
district courts, and there is disagreement as to the correct 
resolution.198 
Ultimately, the approaches of simply granting or denying 
such an application fail to adequately account for and balance the 
competing interests of the government’s role in investigating 
crime and the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy.  
As a result, a middle ground approach is best tailored to fairly 
respect both interests:  Courts should grant the government 
warrants that provide access to an entire e-mail account, even 
though probable cause may not exist for the entire account, but 
should also, if necessary, impose certain minimization procedures 
depending on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.  In 
addition, the plain view exception that applies to physical 
searches and seizures should not apply in this context.  Through 
these methods, the competing interests of the government and 
the individual can effectively be balanced and courts can achieve 
what has been often explained to be the core of the Fourth 
Amendment: reasonableness. 
 
195 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010). 
196 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra Part II. 
